Two Tales of Epistemic Models
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Authors
Publication Date
2019-12-01Journal Title
Thought
ISSN
2161-2234
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Volume
8
Issue
4
Pages
291-302
Type
Article
This Version
AM
Metadata
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Liu, Y. (2019). Two Tales of Epistemic Models. Thought, 8 (4), 291-302. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.435
Abstract
This short paper has two parts. First, we prove a generalisation of Aumann's surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we argue, reveals certain limits of what epistemic models can be.
Sponsorship
Isaac Newton Trust (18.08(o))
Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2018-305)
Embargo Lift Date
2021-12-01
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.435
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/297838
Rights
All rights reserved