Repository logo
 

Two Tales of Epistemic Models

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Abstract

jats:pThis short paper has two parts. First,we prove a generalisation of Aumann’s surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we argue, reveals certain limits of what epistemic models can be.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

epistemic logic, agree to disagree, idealisation, first, third-person asymmetry, epistemic game theory

Journal Title

Thought

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

2161-2234
2161-2234

Volume Title

8

Publisher

Philosophy Documentation Center

Rights

All rights reserved
Sponsorship
Isaac Newton Trust (18.08(o))
Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2018-305)