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dc.contributor.authorAnderlini, Len
dc.contributor.authorFelli, Leonardoen
dc.contributor.authorImmordino, Gen
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-23T00:31:19Z
dc.date.available2019-11-23T00:31:19Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-01en
dc.identifier.issn0047-2530
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/299183
dc.description.abstract© 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plaintiff files a lawsuit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated.
dc.rightsAll rights reserved
dc.rights.uri
dc.titleCostly pretrial agreementsen
dc.typeArticle
prism.issueIdentifier1en
prism.publicationDate2019en
prism.publicationNameJournal of Legal Studiesen
prism.volume48en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.46248
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-07-13en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1086/699841en
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-01-01en
dc.contributor.orcidFelli, Leonardo [0000-0001-6113-6014]
dc.identifier.eissn1537-5366
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2020-01-01


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