Repository logo
 

Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Abstract

In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense).

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields

Journal Title

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0960-8788
1469-3526

Volume Title

25

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Rights

All rights reserved
Sponsorship
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral Fellowship