Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will
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Authors
Publication Date
2017-07-04Journal Title
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
ISSN
0960-8788
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
642-662
Type
Article
This Version
AM
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Leisinger, M. (2017). Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25 (4), 642-662. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1260527
Abstract
In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense).
Sponsorship
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral Fellowship
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1260527
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/299841
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