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dc.contributor.authorLeisinger, Matthewen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-13T00:30:32Z
dc.date.available2019-12-13T00:30:32Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-01en
dc.identifier.issn0279-0750
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/299842
dc.description.abstractLocke's commentators are divided about whether Locke thinks that the idea of a person is a substance idea or a mode idea. I use Locke's theory of kinds to argue for an intermediate interpretation on which the idea of a person is a substance idea that contains a mode idea. As a result, while proponents of the substance interpretation correctly claim that ‘person’ designates a kind of substance, proponents of the mode interpretation are nonetheless correct in insisting that mode ideas play an important role in Locke's account of persons and personal identity.
dc.rightsAll rights reserved
dc.rights.uri
dc.titleLocke on Persons and Other Kinds of Substancesen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage155
prism.issueIdentifier1en
prism.publicationDate2019en
prism.publicationNamePacific Philosophical Quarterlyen
prism.startingPage129
prism.volume100en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.46915
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-07-12en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1111/papq.12255en
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-03-01en
dc.contributor.orcidLeisinger, Matthew [0000-0002-2339-4351]
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0114
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 10:33:53 GMT 2020 - Embargo updated*
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2021-03-01


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