The compatibility of the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) has been considered on a number of occasions by both the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). Following the ECtHR’s decision regarding Diane Pretty’s application, challenges to the compatibility of the Suicide Act 1961 with the ECHR have, in the main, centred on the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death as protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. Through doctrinal and comparative analysis, this thesis critically examines the compatibility of the ban with Article 8 of the ECHR. This analysis reveals that the ban is incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. This thesis also examines the compatibility of the ban with the right to life (Article 2) and the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). Recent case law from the United Kingdom Supreme Court, together with evidence of the impact of the ban on individuals, reveals that the ban violates the right to life of some individuals who are forced to take their lives prematurely before their physical condition deteriorates to such an extent that they can no longer suicide without assistance. Further, in criminalising assistance, the State subjects some individuals to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of the negative obligation in Article 3 and, in failing to protect against the materialisation of that harm, the State fails to comply with its positive obligation to protect under Article 3. This thesis concludes with an examination of whether the ban is discriminatory in violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with any or all of Articles 2, 3 and/or 8. The ban has a disproportionately adverse effect on individuals who, as a result of their medical condition, are physically incapable of suiciding in the same way that individuals without physical disabilities can. Further, having distilled a definition of ‘suicide’ for the purpose of the Suicide Act 1961, it is apparent that the ban only applies to some cases of suicide and that distinction is based on the individual’s medical condition and/or disability, which is a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR. The findings that the ban violates Articles 2, 3 and 8 alone, and taken together with Article 14 of the ECHR, fundamentally alter the narrative surrounding the validity of the Suicide Act 1961 and have profound implications for subsequent challenges to the ban and to the formulation of, and debate surrounding, amendments to the Suicide Act 1961.