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Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title> jats:pSome influential theorists have recently argued that if sex is in some sense ideal, then each partner’s consent is unnecessary: even absent each partner’s consent, neither partner infringes the other’s moral rights. I challenge a key premise in their argument for this alarming conclusion. I instead defend the Common-sense View: if you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. In the course of defending the Common-sense View, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account of Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of two existing accounts of consent while avoiding their shortcomings. I close by suggesting some benefits of my alternative picture and some implications for law reform.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

consent, sex, normative powers, rape, joint action, teamwork

Journal Title

OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0143-6503
1464-3820

Volume Title

40

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Rights

All rights reserved
Sponsorship
Modern Law Review's Mike Redmayne Award for Criminal Law. Royal Institute of Philosophy's Jacobsen Studentship.