Two morals about a modal paradox
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Abstract
jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pChisholm’s paradox serves as an important constraint on our modal theorising. For example, one lesson of the paradox is that widely accepted essentialist theses appear incompatible with metaphysical necessity obeying a logic that includes jats:boldS4</jats:bold>. However, this article cautions against treating Chisholm’s paradox in isolation, as a single line of reasoning. To this end, the article outlines two crucial morals about Chisholm’s paradox which situate the paradox within a broad family of paradoxes. Each moral places significant constraints on the paradox’s solution space. In light of this perspective, the paper applies the two morals to a recently proposed solution to Chisholm’s Paradox by Benj Hellie, Murray and Wilson (in: Bennett and Zimmerman (eds) Oxford studies in metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).</jats:p>
Description
Keywords
Journal Title
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
1573-0964