Bad Apples and Broken Ladders: A Pragmatic Defence of Causal Decision Theory

dc.contributor.author	Bales, Adam	en
dc.date.accessioned	2020-11-10T00:30:07Z
dc.date.available	2020-11-10T00:30:07Z
dc.identifier.issn	0004-8402
dc.identifier.uri	https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/312646
dc.description.abstract	While pragmatic arguments are traditionally seen as supporting decision theory, recent discussions suggest the possibility of pragmatic arguments against this theory. I respond to two such arguments and clarify what it would take for arguments of this sort to succeed.
dc.publisher	Routledge
dc.rights	All rights reserved
dc.rights.uri
dc.title	Bad Apples and Broken Ladders: A Pragmatic Defence of Causal Decision Theory	en
dc.type	Article
prism.publicationName	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.17863/CAM.59744
dcterms.dateAccepted	2020-10-21	en
rioxxterms.version	AM
rioxxterms.licenseref.uri	http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved	en
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate	2020-10-21	en
dc.contributor.orcid	Bales, Adam [0000-0002-9629-0318]
rioxxterms.type	Journal Article/Review	en
cam.orpheus.counter	11	*
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate	2023-11-09

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