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dc.contributor.authorAmbrus, A.
dc.contributor.authorElliott, M.
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-04T16:25:20Z
dc.date.available2020-12-04T16:25:20Z
dc.date.issued2020-07-20
dc.identifier.otherCWPE2071
dc.identifier.otherC-INET2033
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/314725
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk-sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk-sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality. The most stable effici
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics & Cambridge-INET Institute, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge-INET Working Paper Series
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.titleInvestments in Social Ties, Risk Sharing and Inequality
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.61831


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