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Explaining temporal qualia

Published version
Peer-reviewed

Change log

Abstract

Abstract: Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.

Description

Keywords

Paper in General Philosophy of Science, Time, Temporal passage, Temporal experience, Motion perception, Cognitive illusions

Journal Title

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

1879-4912
1879-4920

Volume Title

10

Publisher

Springer Netherlands