Explaining temporal qualia
Authors
Publication Date
2020-01-09Journal Title
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
ISSN
1879-4912
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Volume
10
Issue
1
Language
en
Type
Article
This Version
VoR
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Farr, M. (2020). Explaining temporal qualia. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10 (1) https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6
Abstract
Abstract: Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.
Keywords
Paper in General Philosophy of Science, Time, Temporal passage, Temporal experience, Motion perception, Cognitive illusions
Identifiers
s13194-019-0264-6, 264
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/315924
Rights
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Licence URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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