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dc.contributor.authorElliott, M.
dc.contributor.authorGaleotti., A.
dc.contributor.authorKoh., A.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-02T17:23:55Z
dc.date.available2021-03-02T17:23:55Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-14
dc.identifier.otherCWPE2105
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/318307
dc.description.abstractProdigious amounts of data are being collected by internet companies about their users' preferences. We consider the information design problem of how to share this information with traditional companies which, in turn, compete on price by offering personalised discounts to customers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the internet company is able to perfectly segment and monopolise all such markets. This condition is surprisingly mild, and suggests room for regulatory oversight.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectInformation design
dc.subjectmarket segmentation
dc.subjectprice discrimination
dc.titleMarket Segmentation Through Information
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.65424


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