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Introducing Identity

Published version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Griffiths, O 

Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pThe best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is jats:italicinferentialism</jats:italic> . Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of jats:italictonk</jats:italic>, and the usual extra constraint is jats:italicharmony</jats:italic>. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a logical constant but it doesn’t seem harmonious: standardly, the introduction rule (reflexivity) only concerns a subset of the formulas canvassed by the elimination rule (Leibniz’s law). In response, Read [5, 8] and Klev [3] amend the standard approach. We argue that both attempts fail, in part because of a misconception regarding inferentialism and identity that we aim to identify and clear up.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields

Journal Title

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0022-3611
1573-0433

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC