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dc.contributor.authorElliott, M.
dc.contributor.authorGaleotti., A.
dc.contributor.authorKoh., A,
dc.contributor.authorLi, W.
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-07T15:43:02Z
dc.date.available2022-01-07T15:43:02Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-14
dc.identifier.otherCWPE2105
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/332315
dc.description.abstractAn information designer has precise information about consumers' preferences over products sold by oligopolists. The designer chooses what information to reveal to differentiated firms who, then, compete on price by making personalized offers. We ask what market outcomes the designer can achieve. The information designer is a metaphor for an internet platform who collects data about users and sells it to firms who can, in turn, target discounts and promotions towards different consumers. Our analysis provides new benchmarks demonstrating the power that users' data can endow internet platforms with. These benchmarks speak directly to current regulatory debates.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectInformation design
dc.subjectmarket segmentation
dc.subjectprice discrimination
dc.titleMarket segmentation through information
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.79761
datacite.isnewversionof.doi10.17863/CAM.65424


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