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dc.contributor.authorFasel, Raffael
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-13T23:30:49Z
dc.date.available2022-04-13T23:30:49Z
dc.identifier.issn0065-8995
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336088
dc.description.abstractTheorists interested in the question of how to do jurisprudence often have the aspiration of devel-oping a method that is the correct one. The article challenges this aspiration. Focusing on Julie Dickson’s claim that Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory is the correct method, I show that any method claiming to be the correct one runs into the problem that law is not the kind of thing that a legal theorist could capture independently of her underlying conception of law, and without poten-tially influencing what law is through her own theory. However, this does not spell the end of ju-risprudential methodology. The article proposes that methodologists should shift their focus away from the pursuit of single correct methods and toward studying and weeding out incorrect meth-ods. I outline some of the principles that theorists can use for this purpose and point to promising avenues of research that this shift opens up.
dc.description.sponsorship-
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
dc.titleLess Incorrect Ways of Doing Jurisprudence
dc.typeArticle
dc.publisher.departmentFaculty of Law
dc.date.updated2022-04-13T14:15:39Z
prism.publicationNameThe American journal of jurisprudence
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.83517
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-03-01
rioxxterms.versionAM
dc.contributor.orcidFasel, Raffael [0000-0001-5350-4673]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.orpheus.counter23*
cam.depositDate2022-04-13
pubs.licence-identifierapollo-deposit-licence-2-1
pubs.licence-display-nameApollo Repository Deposit Licence Agreement
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2025-04-13


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