When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?
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Authors
Evans, R.
Reiche, S.
Publication Date
2022-03-28Series
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
Publisher
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Type
Working Paper
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Evans, R., & Reiche, S. (2022). When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.83969
Abstract
We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian (conformist) expert being one whose preference bias is against (for) the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. We show that optimality of an expert depends on characteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed, or fine information can be acquired at low cost, then for symmetric distributions F of the state a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single-peaked (bimodal). If only coarse information can be acquired then a contrarian acquires more information on average, hence is superior. If information is verifiable a contrarian has less incentive to hide unfavorable evidence, and again is superior.
Keywords
Optimal Delegation, Information Acquisition, Evidence Disclosure, Advice, Groupthink
Identifiers
CWPE2222
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.83969
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336548
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