Clubs and Networks
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Authors
Ding, S.
Dziubinski, M.
Moisan, F.
Publication Date
2021-10-25Series
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
Janeway Institute Working Paper Series
Publisher
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Type
Working Paper
Previous Version(s)
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Ding, S., Dziubinski, M., & Moisan, F. (2021). Clubs and Networks. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.83979
Abstract
A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of different club networks. In our model, individuals seek to become members of clubs while clubs wish to have members. Club value is increasing in its size and in the strength of ties with other clubs. We show that a stable membership profile exhibits marginalization of individuals and that this is generally not welfare maximizing. Our second result shows that if returns from strength of ties are convex (concave) then stable memberships support fragmented networks with strong ties (small worlds held together by weak ties). We illustrate the value of these theoretical results through case studies of inter-locking directorates and boards of editors of journals.
Identifiers
CWPE2175, JIWP2109
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.83979
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336558
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