Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables
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Authors
Journal Title
Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytic philosophy
ISSN
0165-0106
Publisher
Springer
Type
Article
This Version
AM
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Clarke, C. Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables. Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytic philosophy https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.84055
Abstract
When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching / short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s causal intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment?
Sponsorship
European Research Council (715530)
Embargo Lift Date
2025-04-29
Identifiers
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.84055
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336634
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