Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables
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Authors
Publication Date
2023Journal Title
Erkenntnis
ISSN
0165-0106
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Type
Article
This Version
VoR
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Clarke, C. (2023). Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables. Erkenntnis https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00570-6
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching/short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s causal intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment?</jats:p>
Sponsorship
European Research Council (715530)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00570-6
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336634
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