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dc.contributor.authorClarke, Christopher
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-29T23:30:42Z
dc.date.available2022-04-29T23:30:42Z
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/336634
dc.description.abstractWhen evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching / short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s causal intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment?
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
dc.titleWhy Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables
dc.typeArticle
dc.publisher.departmentCentre For Research In Arts, Social Sciences And Humanities
dc.date.updated2022-04-29T10:05:27Z
prism.publicationNameErkenntnis: an international journal of analytic philosophy
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.84055
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-04-22
rioxxterms.versionAM
dc.contributor.orcidClarke, Christopher [0000-0002-6225-0115]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
pubs.funder-project-idEuropean Research Council (715530)
cam.orpheus.counter5*
cam.depositDate2022-04-29
pubs.licence-identifierapollo-deposit-licence-2-1
pubs.licence-display-nameApollo Repository Deposit Licence Agreement
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2025-04-29


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