Despite China’s recent rise as major public finance provider for the electricity sector of the developing world, there is limited knowledge on the determinants of the allocation of its portfolio. Building on a newly constructed unit-level dataset with global investments into power plant infrastructure from Chinese Developmental Institutions (CDIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), a two-part model (1999-2018) and 39 primary interviews, we investigate the influence of variables related to self-interest, need and merit. We find that countries politically aligned with China on human rights with low control of corruption and institutional quality scores are more likely to receive CDI finance. In contrast to common claims, resource endowments do not play an important role. Furthermore, over time, CDIs move closer to the MDB portfolio, increasingly supporting plants in wealthier countries with lower investment risks and higher electrification rates – a trend that might aggravate already severe investment gaps for low-income countries.