Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation
Published version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Van Der Maas, M
Moore, SW
Abstract
Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.
Description
Keywords
46 Information and Computing Sciences, 4604 Cybersecurity and Privacy, Clinical Research
Journal Title
CYSARM 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race
Conference Name
CCS '20: 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
ACM
Publisher DOI
Sponsorship
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/N509620/1)
EPSRC (via Queen's University Of Belfast) (R1098ECI)
EPSRC (1940704)
EPSRC (via Queen's University Of Belfast) (R1098ECI)
EPSRC (1940704)