Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation

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Authors
Van Der Maas, M
Moore, SW
Publication Date
2020-11-13
Journal Title
CYSARM 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race
Conference Name
CCS '20: 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISBN
9781450380911
Publisher
ACM
Pages
1-12
Type
Conference Object
This Version
VoR
Metadata
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Citation
Van Der Maas, M., & Moore, S. (2020). Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation. CYSARM 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1145/3411505.3418437
Abstract
Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.
Keywords
Clinical Research
Sponsorship
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/N509620/1)
EPSRC (via Queen's University Of Belfast) (R1098ECI)
EPSRC (1940704)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3411505.3418437
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/337408
Rights
Attribution 4.0 International
Licence URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Attribution 4.0 International