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dc.contributor.authorAidt, T.
dc.contributor.authorLacroix, J.
dc.contributor.authorMeonx, P-E.
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-05T16:43:13Z
dc.date.available2022-07-05T16:43:13Z
dc.date.issued2022-05-18
dc.identifier.otherCWPE2232
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/338810
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a new mechanism that allows political elites from a non-democratic regime to survive a democratic transition: connections. We document this mechanism in the transition from the Vichy regime to democracy in post-World War II France. The parliamentarians who had supported the Vichy regime were purged in a two-stage process where each case was judged twice by two different courts. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we show that Law graduates, a powerful social group in French politics with strong connections to one of the two courts, had a clearance rate that was 10 percentage points higher than others. This facilitated the persistence of that elite group. A systematic analysis of 17,589 documents from the defendants' dossiers is consistent with the hypothesis that the connections of Law graduates to one of the two courts were a major driver of their ability to avoid the purge. We consider and rule out alternative mechanisms.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectPurges
dc.subjectPolitical transitions
dc.subjectElite persistence
dc.subjectConnections
dc.titleThe Origins of Elite Persistence: Evidence from Political Purges in post-World War II France
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.86217


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