Third-Party Sale of Information
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Authors
Evans, R.
Park, I-U.
Publication Date
2022-05-18Series
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
Publisher
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Type
Working Paper
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Evans, R., & Park, I. (2022). Third-Party Sale of Information. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.86218
Abstract
We study design and pricing of information by a monopoly information provider for a buyer in a trading relationship with a seller. The profit-maximizing information structure has a binary threshold character. This structure is inefficient when seller production cost is low. Compared with a situation of no information, the information provider increases welfare if cost is high but reduces it if cost is low. A monopoly provider creates higher welfare than a competitive market in information if the prior distribution of buyer valuations is not too concentrated. Giving the seller a veto over the information contract generates full efficiency
Keywords
Information Sale, Mechanism Design, Information Design
Identifiers
CWPE2233
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.86218
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/338811
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