Gated communities across the world have become a complex constellation, which have triggered new questions. For example, how do gated communities respond to ongoing urban transformation and changing regulatory environments? How are gated communities managed for long-term survival? How are the common properties within gated communities organized and allocated? These multi-faceted but interrelated issues are largely framed by those who are closely involved in the localised-scale development and management processes, including local governments, developers, professional property management companies, and homeowners, although the author does not deny the influence of actors and institutional rules acting beyond the microscale.

This thesis examines the power relations among the key actors involved in different points of decision-making during the development and management of gated communities, regarding the initial development stage, the physical design, common ownership, and collective management of gated communities. Shanghai, one of the most developed Chinese cities with a burgeoning housing market, is used as a case study. China provides a very different institutional context from Western countries, including the inadequate legal protection for individual property rights and the supreme intervention of local governments in urban development and community governance. Drawing upon new institutionalism and using a primarily qualitative research method, the research investigates not only who has more power over whom and the degrees of power imbalance, but also what types of power are borne by various actors and the various ways that power is exercised through the operation of institutional rules. Also, the research explores the bases of legitimacy of different actors’ behaviour.

This thesis argues that the micro-level power dynamics in developing and managing gated communities is heavily influenced by informal rules and legitimacy under the structural context of an unfledged market, the nascent civil society, and the powerful state in urban China. Actors carrying out these processes often conduct convert practices to evade responsibility and maintain their self-interest, while appearing to conform to formal rules. Local governments and their internal departments are not merely the rule implementers, whereas developers, property management companies, and homeowners are neither only rule takers. The control of land resources and the enforceable formal legislation do not guarantee Chinese local governments ultimate resource and regulatory power over market players and homeowners. The author discloses that the local government’s regulatory power is weakened by the inconsistent goals and unequal power of different functional departments, allowing non-government actors to capitalize on every rent-seeking opportunity.