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dc.contributor.authorJamasb, Toorajen_GB
dc.contributor.authorNillesen, Paulen_GB
dc.contributor.authorPollitt, Michael G.en_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:24Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:24Z
dc.date.created2003-02en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:24Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/344
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/344
dc.description.abstractLiberalisation of generation and supply activities in the electricity sectors is often followed by regulatory reform of distribution networks. In order to improve the efficiency of distribution utilities, some regulators have adopted incentive regulation schemes that rely on performance benchmarking. Although regulation benchmarking can influence the �regulation game�, the subject has received limited attention. This paper discusses how strategic behaviour can result in inefficient behaviour by firms. We also present a survey of issues encountered by electricity regulators. We then use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method with US utility data to examine implications of selected cases of strategic behaviour. The results show that gaming can have significant effects on the measured performance and profitability of firms.en_GB
dc.format.extent1178231 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: L94en_GB
dc.subject.othergaming, strategic behaviour, regulation, benchmarking, electricityen_GB
dc.titleStrategic Behaviour under Regulation Benchmarkingen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5430


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