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dc.contributor.authorAidt, Toke S.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorMagris, Francescoen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:26Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:26Z
dc.date.created2003-02en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:26Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/350
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/350
dc.description.abstractIn a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement while in office. This paper demonstrates that performance voting can - partly or wholly - solve the capital levy problem. We characterise the �best� non-expropriating tax policies that can be sustained in a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium; show when this coincides with the second best tax policy; and discuss, in detail, the robustness of the result.en_GB
dc.format.extent423448 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: H21, D72en_GB
dc.subject.otherperformance voting, capital taxation, time consistencyen_GB
dc.titleCapital Taxation and Electoral Accountabilityen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5194


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