Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGale, Douglasen_GB
dc.contributor.authorSabourian, Hamiden_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:27Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:27Z
dc.date.created2003-04en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:27Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/354
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/354
dc.description.abstractRubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria, but the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is competitive. By contrast, in the more general case of heterogeneous markets, we show there exists a continuum of (non-competitive) Markov perfect equilibria. However, a refinement of the Markov property, which we call monotonicity, does suffice to guarantee perfectly competitive equilibria, if, and only if, it is monotonic. The monotonicity property is closely related to the concept of Nash equilibrium with complexity costs.en_GB
dc.format.extent339047 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.titleMarkov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Gamesen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5004


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record