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dc.contributor.authorEvans, Joanneen_GB
dc.contributor.authorGreen, Richard J.en_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.date.created2003-05en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/358
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/358
dc.description.abstractIn an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Econometric analysis on monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two conflicting hypotheses. On a static view, increases in competition and the capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices. If generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a few months before the abolition of the Pool. That view implies that NETA reduced prices.en_GB
dc.format.extent555814 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: L94en_GB
dc.subject.otherElectricity, market power, concentration, market rulesen_GB
dc.titleWhy did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998?en_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5453


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