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dc.contributor.authorAidt, Toke S.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorDutta, J.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorLoukoianova, Elenaen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:35Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:35Z
dc.date.created2003-10en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:35Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/376
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/376
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a theory of policy myopia. Policy myopia arises when rational voters set performance standards that allow elected politicians to distort the portfolio of public investments towards short-term investments. We show that the fact that voters cannot observe immediately how much politicians invested in certain types of public goods is not in itself sufficient to generate policy myopia. Policy myopia, then, arises in societies where electoral control is imperfect or in society where tax revenues cannot be committed in advance. The analysis is motivated by a number of stylized facts about public spending patterns across time and space.en_GB
dc.format.extent781773 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: D72; D82en_GB
dc.subject.otherMyopia; public goods; electoral accountabilityen_GB
dc.titlePolicy Myopiaen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5061


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