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dc.contributor.authorLittlechild, Stephen C.
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:46Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:46Z
dc.date.created2004-04en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:46Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/405
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/405
dc.description.abstractThere has been widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges, leading to increasingly severe price controls. Oftel and the Competition Commission identified the Caller Pays Principle (CPP) as the source of the market power that enabled termination charges to be set above cost. Both accepted that the alternative Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) would solve the monopoly problem, but rejected it primarily because RPP might lead to significant numbers of users switching off their mobile phones. Evidence from RPP countries is consistent with RPP solving market power problems. CPP is almost certainly less efficient than RPP. US and other evidence suggests that the argument about customers switching off phones is not tenable. If the aim is efficient resource allocation, undistorted by excessive termination charges and subsidised handsets, to be achieved by competition rather than price controls, then RPP is preferable to CPP.en_GB
dc.format.extent173777 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: mobile termination charges, calling party pays, receiving party paysen_GB
dc.subject.otherL51, L96en_GB
dc.titleMobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Paysen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5395


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