This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the $individuum$-theory. The $individuum$-theory is criticised by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by $‘Quoniam\; de\; generali’$ as well as by the unpublished $Isagoge$ commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is taken into account for the first time. The $individuum$-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. Its main strategies for such a claim are presented, namely: putting forward identity “by indifference,” distinguishing $status$ and $attentiones$, and neutralising opposite predicates. It is argued that these strategies have parallels in Peter Abelard’s own views. The $individuum$-theory’s paradoxical realism seems to defend universal $res$ after criticisms were advanced against more traditional material essence realism and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists’ tools (particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavour.