Individuals as Universals: Audacious Views in Early Twelfth-Century Realism

Abstract

This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the $\textit{individuum}$-theory. The $\textit{individuum}$-theory is criticised by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by $\textit{‘Quoniam de generali’}$ as well as by the unpublished $\textit{Isagoge}$ commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is taken into account for the first time. The $\textit{individuum}$-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. Its main strategies for such a claim are presented, namely: putting forward identity “by indifference,” distinguishing $\textit{status}$ and $\textit{attentiones}$, and neutralising opposite predicates. It is argued that these strategies have parallels in Peter Abelard’s own views. The $\textit{individuum}$-theory’s paradoxical realism seems to defend universal $\textit{res}$ after criticisms were advanced against more traditional material essence realism and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists’ tools (particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavour.