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What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

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Article

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Authors

Masterman, Christopher 

Abstract

Brauer (2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer's argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer's argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer's argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer's argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer's argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound.

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Journal Title

Philosophical Studies

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0031-8116
1573-0883

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Publisher

Springer

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