Is statistical learning a mechanism?
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
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Repository DOI
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Authors
Betzler, RJ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3971-6482
Abstract
Philosophers of science have offered several definitions of mechanism, most of which have biological or neuroscientific roots. In this paper, I consider whether these definitions apply equally well to cognitive science. I examine this question by looking at the case of statistical learning, which has been called a domain-general learning mechanism in the cognitive scientific literature. I argue that statistical learning does not constitute a mechanism in the philosophical sense of the term. This conclusion points to significant limitations in the scope of the mechanist philosophy when it comes to accounting for explanation in cognitive science.
Description
Keywords
Mechanism, philosophy of psychology, statistical learning
Journal Title
Philosophical Psychology
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0951-5089
1465-394X
1465-394X
Volume Title
29
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Publisher DOI
Sponsorship
European Research Council (284123)
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement no 284123.