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Global carbon price asymmetry

cam.depositDate2022-05-31
cam.issuedOnline2022-06-03
cam.orpheus.counter3
cam.orpheus.successMon Jun 27 07:19:04 BST 2022 - Embargo updated
dc.contributor.authorRitz, RA
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-01T23:30:23Z
dc.date.available2022-06-01T23:30:23Z
dc.date.issued2022-07
dc.date.updated2022-05-31T16:35:53Z
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a social planner who chooses countries’ carbon prices so as to maximize global welfare. Product markets are characterized by firm heterogeneity, market power, and international trade. Because of the market-power distortion, the planner’s optimal policy is second-best. The main insight is that optimal carbon prices may be highly asymmetric: zero in some countries and above the social cost of carbon in countries with relatively dirty production. This result obtains even though a uniform global carbon price is always successful at reducing countries’ emissions. Competition policy that mitigates market power may enable stronger climate action.
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.85076
dc.identifier.issn0095-0696
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/337670
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.publisher.departmentJudge Business School
dc.publisher.urlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102687
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject38 Economics
dc.subject3801 Applied Economics
dc.subject3802 Econometrics
dc.subject3803 Economic Theory
dc.subject13 Climate Action
dc.titleGlobal carbon price asymmetry
dc.typeArticle
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-05-27
prism.publicationNameJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
pubs.licence-display-nameApollo Repository Deposit Licence Agreement
pubs.licence-identifierapollo-deposit-licence-2-1
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102687

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