Non-human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal
Published version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Shevlin, H https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7753-3281
Abstract
jats:pMost scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non‐human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call thejats:italicspecificity problem</jats:italic>. After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely thejats:italictheory‐light approach</jats:italic>proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term thejats:italicmodest theoretical approach</jats:italic>, arguing that it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable.</jats:p>
Description
Keywords
animal cognition, consciousness, measurement of consciousness, non-human consciousness, other minds, theories of consciousness
Journal Title
Mind and Language
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0268-1064
1468-0017
1468-0017
Volume Title
36
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Sponsorship
Leverhulme Trust (RC‐2015‐067)