Mapping the Minds of Others

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Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, and the ease or difficulty with which one can make them. I illustrate this by considering what it would be to take mental states to be map-like in format, showing that this would result in a distinctively limited form of mindreading. I close by articulating the significance of this for the emerging picture of great ape mindreading.

5204 Cognitive and Computational Psychology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 52 Psychology, Mental Health, Brain Disorders, 3 Good Health and Well Being
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Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Peterhouse, Cambridge Trinity Hall, Cambridge