Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games


Type
Article
Change log
Authors
Block, Juan I 
Levine, David K 
Abstract

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.

Description
Keywords
Repeated game, Folk theorem, Self-referential game, Approximate equilibrium
Journal Title
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0020-7276
1432-1270
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Sponsorship
Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.