The Bodily Theory of Pain

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Owesen, Erlend Winderen Finke  ORCID logo

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pOne use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable to the Experiential Theory, because it accords better with common sense and offers a better interpretation or semantics of ordinary pain reports.</jats:p>


Acknowledgements: Thanks to Arif Ahmed, Murat Aydede, Adam Bradley, Ludvig Fæhn Fuglestvedt, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, Colin Klein, Daniel Ott, Oscar Westerblad, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Joint Session 2019 and Oslo Mind Group for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aker Scholarship for financial support.

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields, Clinical Research, Pain Research, Chronic Pain, Neurosciences
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Review of Philosophy and Psychology
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC