What’s the Matter with Super-Humeanism?


Type
Article
Change log
Authors
Simpson, William MR 
Abstract

Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.

Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Journal Title
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0007-0882
1464-3537
Volume Title
72
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Rights
All rights reserved
Sponsorship
The author would also like to acknowledge the financial support of Peterhouse (Cambridge) in the form of a Blacker–Loewe Doctoral Studentship in Philosophy, and The John Templeton Foundation ('God and the Book of Nature’, grant no. 61507).