Impairing the impairment argument.

Published version
Repository DOI

Change log
Authors
van Oosterum, Kyle 
Abstract

Blackshaw and Hendricks have recently developed and defended the impairment argument against abortion, arguing that the immorality of giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) provides us with reason to believe that abortion is immoral. In this paper, we forward two criticisms of the impairment argument. First, we highlight that, as it currently stands, the argument is very weak and accomplishes very little. Second, we argue that Blackshaw and Hendricks are fundamentally mistaken about what makes giving a child FAS immoral. Once we acknowledge this, it is clear that our intuitions about giving a child FAS provide no support for the supposed immorality of abortion.

Description

Peer reviewed: True

Keywords
abortion - induced
Journal Title
J Med Ethics
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0306-6800
1473-4257
Volume Title
Publisher
BMJ
Sponsorship
Arts and Humanities Research Council (NA)
Institute for Ethics in AI (NA)