Elusive Externalism


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Type
Article
Change log
Authors
Salow, BJ 
Abstract

Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like.

Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Journal Title
Mind
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0026-4423
1460-2113
Volume Title
Publisher
Oxford University Press