The credit incentive to be a maverick.
cam.issuedOnline | 2018-12-03 | |
dc.contributor.author | Heesen, Remco | |
dc.contributor.orcid | Heesen, Remco [0000-0003-3823-944X] | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-01-22T00:30:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-01-22T00:30:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-08 | |
dc.description.abstract | There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue that (even in theory) this idea is less straightforward than it may seem. Interpreting mavericks as scientists who prioritize rewards over speed and risk, I show in a deliberatively simple model that there is a fixed mixture which is not particularly likely to be desirable and which credit incentives cannot alter. I consider a way around this result, but this has some major drawbacks. I conclude that credit incentives are not as promising a way to create a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers as one might have thought. | |
dc.description.sponsorship | This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant SES 1254291 and by an Early Career Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust and the Isaac Newton Trust. | |
dc.format.medium | Print-Electronic | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.17863/CAM.35595 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1879-2510 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-3681 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/288279 | |
dc.language | eng | |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | |
dc.publisher.url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007 | |
dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | 5003 Philosophy | |
dc.subject | 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies | |
dc.subject | 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields | |
dc.title | The credit incentive to be a maverick. | |
dc.type | Article | |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2018-11-28 | |
prism.endingPage | 12 | |
prism.publicationDate | 2019 | |
prism.publicationName | Stud Hist Philos Sci | |
prism.startingPage | 5 | |
prism.volume | 76 | |
pubs.funder-project-id | Isaac Newton Trust (1608(ac)) | |
pubs.funder-project-id | Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2016-551) | |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2019-08 | |
rioxxterms.licenseref.uri | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | |
rioxxterms.versionofrecord | 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007 |
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