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Strengthening the Paris Agreement through trade? The potential and limitations of EU preferential trade agreements for climate governance

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Peer-reviewed

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Abstract

AbstractSince 2019, a commitment has been included in the European Union’s (EU) preferential trade agreements to effectively implement the Paris Agreement. This commitment now exists in nine ratified or pending trade agreements. Yet research into the legal nature and institutional implications of this linkage between the Paris Agreement and EU trade agreements remains scant. Relying on the governance stringency framework, we explore the evolution of this commitment across EU trade agreements, highlighting its transition from a statement of shared intent into a legally binding obligation. We argue that the EU’s latest trade agreements increase the cost of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and bolster the Paris Agreement’s obligations of conduct, namely parties’ procedural duties, the expectation of progressively more ambitious climate pledges, and the commitment of all parties to realise these to the best of their efforts. Finally, we suggest that the implementation and enforcement mechanisms available through EU trade agreements in the context of the Paris Agreement commitment may prove pivotal in realising the climate regime’s objectives.

Description

Acknowledgements: This article was initially presented at a seminar organised by the University of Copenhagen, where valuable feedback was received from the discussants, Evgeny Postnikov and Alessandro Monti, as well as the workshop participants. Further comments on the article were later provided by Fariborz Zelli, Harro van Asselt, Jean-Frédéric Morin, Sikina Jinnah, Axel Marx, Jan Orbie, James Harrison, Henrik Larsen, Johan Eliasson, and the two anonymous journal reviewers. We are grateful for their suggestions. Any mistakes remain the responsibility of the authors.

Journal Title

International Environmental Agreements Politics Law and Economics

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

1567-9764
1573-1553

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Sponsorship
Carlsbergfondet (CF24-0499)
Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (11H7122N)
Københavns Universitet (PhD stipendiary)