Between Description and Evaluation: How Sociologists Do Normativity

Abstract

Abstract We argue that the philosophical distinction between the “good” and the “right” is helpful in discerning the plurality of normative stakes in sociological accounts. Our argument stands in contrast to other approaches to the question of normativity in sociology on several grounds. Primarily, we locate the normative content of sociological accounts in their actual explanatory, descriptive, or interpretative empirical models, rather than in their deep theoretical cores. We contend that sociologists inevitably engage in normativity, even when employing empirical constructs that appear unanchored from robust theoretical commitments. Furthermore, we propose that appeals to the good life and justice cut across different types of sociological accounts. Surveying a number of celebrated theoretical and empirical studies, drawn from a variety of sociological subfields, we bring to light how these normative modalities take shape in routine applications and discussions of three sociological concepts: (1) agency, (2) structures, and (3) processes.