Does competition increase pass-through?
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Abstract
In recent years, the literature has seen a surge of interest in pass-through as an economic tool. At the same time, widespread concerns have emerged about the rising market power of firms. How does competition affect pass-through? A standard intuition is that more competition makes prices more cost-reflective and hence raises the rate of cost pass- through. This paper shows this conclusion is sensitive to the routine assumption that firms’ marginal costs are constant. With modestly convex costs, market power can raise pass-through (even when it lies below 1). These results have implications for antitrust policy, environmental regulation, and welfare analysis.
Description
Keywords
Journal Title
RAND Journal of Economics
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0741-6261
1756-2171
1756-2171
Volume Title
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Rights and licensing
Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International

