Legal controls on lying public officials

Abstract

Considering the harm that is caused by lying public officials, to what extent does the law address this harm, and how? To the extent that it does not, is a broader legal remedy possible, and what might it look like? This thesis first sets out the harm that is caused by officials who lie – specifically, damage to public trust, and the wrongful reallocation of power – and argues that such lying might only be justified if it can be said to serve another important state function. In Chapters 2 to 5, I discuss where and how official lying is controlled by different areas of law (defamation, misconduct in public office, ‘administration of justice’ offences including perjury and perverting the course of justice, and judicial review), how lies that do or do not attract legal consequences are distinguished from each other, and the extent to which this tracks with analysis in Chapter 1 of why official lying is harmful. It will be seen that it is far from the case that officials can lie with impunity. However, there is no law against a public official who tells a lie directly to the public with no consequential financial loss or gain and no individual reputational loss. In view of certain specific proposals for such a law, I therefore seek in Chapter 6 to draw lessons from the existing law as to what kinds of distinctions we would need for a dedicated offence against official lying, and ultimately whether such a law would be possible and/or desirable.