Shareholder Accountability in Speculative Meme Stocks Trading: A Framework for Liability
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Notes the existence of an asymmetry problem, whereby the primary focus of financial regulation is on investor protection, with limited mechanisms for making investors themselves accountable for harmful market conduct. Looks at accountability mechanisms from international investment law. Proposes a framework for shareholder liability in cases of speculative or manipulative trading, with reference to the meme stock trading phenomenon of 2021 as a case study.
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0144-1027
0144-1027
0144-1027
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Sweet and Maxwell
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Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International

