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Trustworthy AI: a plea for modest anthropocentrism

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jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pSimion and Kelp defend a non-anthropocentric account of trustworthy AI, based on the idea that the obligations of AI systems should be sourced in purely functional norms. In this commentary, I highlight some pressing counterexamples to their account, involving AI systems that reliably fulfil their functions but are untrustworthy because those functions are antagonistic to the interests of the trustor. Instead, I outline an alternative account, based on the idea that AI systems should not be considered primarily as tools but as technological participants in social practices. Specifically, I propose to source the obligations of an AI system in the norms that should govern the role it plays within the social practices it participates in, taking into account any changes to the social practices that its participation may bring about. This proposal is anthropocentric insofar as it ascribes obligations to AI systems that are similar to those of human participants in social practices, but only modestly so, as it does not require trustworthy AI to have contentious anthropomorphic capacities (e.g. for consciousness or moral responsibility).</jats:p>


Funder: Stiftung Mercator


46 Information and Computing Sciences, 4608 Human-Centred Computing, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies

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Asian Journal of Philosophy

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Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Leverhulme Trust (RC-2015-067)
Leverhulme Trust (RC-2015-067)
Stiftung Mercator (200446)