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Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

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Authors

Abstract

jats:pIn this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between his thesis of incommensurability, in particular in its later taxonomic form, and van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I show that if it is the case the empirically equivalent but genuinely distinct theories do exist, then we can expect such theories to be taxonomically incommensurable. I link this to Hacking's claim that Kuhn was a nominalist. I also argue that Kuhn and van Fraassen do not differ as much as might be thought as regards the claim that observation is theory laden.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields

Journal Title

Philosophy of Science

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0031-8248
1539-767X

Volume Title

70

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP)