Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation

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dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.date.created1999-03en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.description.abstractHow many international agreements should there be, and who should sign them? When policy issues are separable, linking them in a �grand international agreement� facilitates policy cooperation by reallocating slack enforcement power. When policy issues are substitutes, issue linkage further facilitates policy cooperation by increasing the amount of available enforcement power. The contrary happens when issues are complements. Then a better strategy can be to delegate policy issues to diferent independent national agencies. Constitutional rules that permit credible delegation to agents with dfferent objectives from governments facilitate international cooperation by generating stronger credible threats. Implications for multilateral agreements are discussed.en_GB
dc.format.extent800036 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5186
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/424
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/424
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: E61, F13, F42, H77en_GB
dc.subject.otherInternational agreements, Policy cooperation, Policy coordination, Cross-border spillovers, International institutionsen_GB
dc.titleIssue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperationen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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